Using a unique household panel data set for rural India covering the years 1993/1994 and 2004/2005 we test a key theoretical assertion of caste and its effects, namely that marginalised social groups fare worse in terms of income levels when resident in villages dominated by upper castes. We also test whether marginalised groups perform better or worse in villages where their own group is dominant. We proceed to explore the implications for income growth and for poverty incidence and persistence. After controlling for potential locational confounds, upper caste dominance confers a positive externality on other social groups. This externality is discounted by group specific 'oppression' effects which range in size from zero to 16 percent of mean income and peak for Scheduled Caste (SC) and Other Backward Classes (OBC) households. Further, we identify positive and large own dominance (village 'enclave') effects that account for as much as a quarter of mean income for SC households in the post reform years. These results are robust to how dominance is measured. We also identify pathways through which identity-based welfare disparities may be reduced; while such disparities are widening, their causes show signs of both persistence and change. Whereas education matters, land redistribution provides the key to eliminating the adverse effects of upper caste dominance. Even after factor endowment and other controls have been added, and with the notable exception of those in SC dominated villages, SCs not only perform worse than other groups but have fallen further behind during the post reform years. 
INTRODUCTION
More than 50 years on and in spite of such early resistance, the aggressive use of affirmative action and radical legislative interventions, identity-based inequality and poverty have remained stark features of post-independence India (Deshpande 2001; Kijima 2006; Gang et al 2008a) . Notwithstanding that the intensity of caste 1 barriers may have softened with the passage of time, 2 extensive reservations in public sector jobs, higher education institutions and political assemblies have not sufficed to prevent Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe households from being overrepresented among the country's poor, illiterate and in the former case, also the landless. 1 Caste may refer to jati (sub-caste) or the more general varna, the latter comprising four broad occupational groups with Brahmins at the top and untouchables as a separate category. Each varna contains innumerable jatis who with few exceptions practice intra-marriage (endogamy). 2 Examples from the recent past include caste demarcators in how people dressed and spoke and what they were allowed to do. In 19 th Century Kerala, "when a Namboodiri Brahmin approached, a Paraiya labourer had to cry out in advance, lest the sight of him pollute his superior" (Guha 2007; 287) . Also in Kerala and when talking to a person of higher caste, members of lowly ranked castes were expected to use debasing words to describe themselves (Menon 1994; 19) . Nambissan (1996) presents historical illustrations of how Scheduled Caste children, while permitted to attend school, could be denied entry to the classroom. 3 Scheduled Castes, comprising 16.2 % of the country's population in 2001, are former 'untouchables', while Scheduled Tribes, accounting for 8.2 % of the population in the same year, are tribes perceived as historically disadvantaged. Article 15 of India's Constitution emphasises the 'disabling' effect of low social status and article 46 underscores the collective responsibility for promoting the educational and economic interests of individuals of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe backgrounds (Bayly 1999; 68-69) . The Constitution also refers to an additional category of disadvantaged citizens, an issue addressed firstly by the Other Backward Class Commission appointed by Prime Minister Nehru, and later and more decisively by the Mandal Commission In this paper we use a household panel covering the years 1993/1994 and 2004/2005 to examine two possible explanations for identity-based disadvantage in rural India. The first, the oppression hypothesis, originates in M. N. Srinivas's theory of caste dominance which portrays a caste that in addition to strong numerical presence is also economically powerful (Srinivas 1955) . This oppression hypothesis is discrimination oriented, epitomises the introductory quotes and advances the view that historically marginalised groups fare worse when resident in villages dominated by upper castes. We test this hypothesis for income levels, and explore the implications for income growth and for poverty incidence and persistence.
The second, the village enclave explanation, is theoretically ambiguous and captures a situation where a historically marginalised group is dominant at the village level. Upwards mobility may then be inhibited by factors that either wholly or in part are internal to the group in question. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) illustrate one such mechanism albeit in the urban context of Dadar, Mumbai, where the density of jati based labour market networks, via their effects on educational choice, is held responsible for slow upwards mobility across generations of low caste, young men.
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In a rural setting, a strong preference for traditional occupations or the onset of social inertia (e.g. Peyton Young 2001) could give rise to similar, 'interlocking' effects.
Empirical studies of education and labour market outcomes in (mainly immigrant) enclaves infuse more optimism about enclave potential (e.g. Edin et al 2003; Cortes Mandal Commission's recommendations, which extended reservation benefits to OBCs, were declared constitutionally legitimate by the Supreme Court in 1992 after agitations and intense controversy (Parikh 1998) . 4 Such strictness resonates with Louis Dumont's (1970) portrayal of purity and pollution as immutable principles of Hindu society (Bayly 1999; 15) . M. N. Srinivas (1966) gives numerous examples of more fluid inter-caste relations, arguing that analysis of social relations through the lens of varna 'successfully obscured the dynamic features of caste during the traditional or pre-British period (ibid. 1966;2) .' 5 Muslims, the largest religious minority, accounted for 13.4 % of India's population in 2001. 6 Our reference here is to India's landmark economic liberalisation programme, initiated in 1991, but with its main effects kicking in only after the first panel round (See footnote 14). 7 In contrast and using NSS data, Das (2007) finds evidence of successful self-employment enclaves among educated Muslim men in India.
2006). A less hostile village environment could prevent the psychological internalisation of self-fulfilling and negative self beliefs that might otherwise lock individuals of marginalised backgrounds into low level equilibrium traps (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Hoff and Pandey 2006) . By reducing the social distance between parties to rural transactions, own enclaves could also, as Anderson's (2005) evidence demonstrates, improve the operation of vital rural markets.
While the oppression and the negative enclave explanation may inhibit income growth and contribute to poverty persistence, there is a marked contrast in how policies could address and alleviate identity-based disparities. While oppression would require society-wide attitudinal transformations, the negative enclave explanation would call for reforms targeting the marginalised community itself. The positive enclave explanation adds an intriguing policy dilemma: marginalised groups performing better in their own village enclaves could weaken the case for social integration.
BACKGROUND AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
In India, empirical research on caste has focused on discrimination, mainly within the labour market (e.g. Banerjee and Knight 1985; Kingdon 1998 and 2002; Dutta 2006; Iversen and Raghavendra 2006; Thorat and Attewell 2007) . The evidence shows that individuals of SC and ST background are indeed at a disadvantage 8 -through lower wages, a higher propensity of being stuck in dead end jobs (e.g. Banerjee and Knight 1985) or inferior employment terms, such as casual employment (Dutta 2006; Das and Dutta 2007) . Recent research has also documented how discrimination extends to upper end urban occupations and jobs (Madeshwaran and Attewell 2007; Newman and Deshpande 2007) .
While important, the labour market is only one market where individuals from marginalised social groups may experience differential treatment. To date, however, little systematic knowledge exists about discrimination in credit, insurance or other key markets or particular to rural areas, markets for agricultural inputs and outputs. There is also limited evidence on whether a person's caste, religious or tribal identity 8 Gang et al (2008b) confirm that OBCs also have lower living standards relative to the mainstream population. 9 Hatlebakk (2009) presents evidence on the relationship between caste and credit transaction terms in rural Nepal.
circumscribes the access to poverty-oriented public policy programmes or public services in general.
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Even so, Shah et al's (2006) recent study of untouchability in rural India found that in 45-50 percent of the villages surveyed, Dalits were prevented from selling milk to village dairy cooperatives. 11 Such 'bans' could be rooted in purity and pollution ideals and the intimate links between a person's identity and the preparation and handling of food and water; the same study found that in 30-40 percent of the same villages, Dalits were prevented from full participation in local markets and often from entering village shops. 12 Further and wellknown, SC hamlets tend to be separate from the main village and often have their own drinking water source.
In rural Karnataka, children from orthodox Brahmin households may be forced to take a bath before entering their house after interacting with peers from 'inferior' castes while in school. A rich gamut of mechanisms for differential treatment thus persists and may affect everyday social interactions, limit the willingness to transact, the terms of such transactions as well as the access to productive resources, public policy programmes and services. Put differently, oppression could, in principle, circumscribe the access to all markets (land, labour, credit, insurance, output, and input markets), affect production costs and limit investment opportunities and returns.
Our data do not permit a precise identification of discrimination within a particular market or in the access to a specific public service, but facilitate instead identification of upper caste oppression and of negative or positive village enclave effects on household economic welfare, measured by income. Further, by introducing control variables gradually in our econometric analysis, we are able to explore the pathways through which such oppression and enclave effects operate and whether the latter are transmuting in the post reform era.
Our study advances the literature as follows. Aggregating across markets, as we do, a small number of studies test for identity-based disadvantage, but do not test the effects of village level upper caste or own group dominance on the economic 10 Exceptions include Dreze and Kingdon's (2001) study of school participation in rural India, suggesting that Scheduled Caste children have an 'intrinsic disadvantage' and a lower chance of attending school even after household wealth, parental education and motivation and school quality are controlled for. See also Thorat and Lee's (2006) study of discrimination in food related government programmes. Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) explore, among other issues, the effects of community heterogeneity on public services (goods) availability in India. 11 The study covered 550 villages in 11 main states. 12 As noted by Madsen (1991 ), Parry (1999 , Iversen and Raghavendra (2006) Anderson's study uses cross-sectional data for north and central Bihar and south and south-eastern Uttar Pradesh, which are part of India's "poverty belt" and more than elsewhere in the country riddled by inter-caste tensions and conflict (Bayly 1999; 345) . We use a panel data set that in its base year 1993/1994 is representative for rural areas of most of India's major states (see section II). In contrast to Anderson, we estimate the impacts of upper caste and own group dominance on household income and explore the implications for growth and poverty for social groups where such effects may be expected to be most pronounced. 13 We also distinguish externalities associated with residence in upper caste dominated villages from social group specific oppression effects within the same village regimes. Finally, our panel households are followed from 1993/1994 up to 2004/2005 which enables us to investigate whether India's economic liberalisation programme, initiated in 1991 but with its main effects being felt only after the first panel round, 14 has mitigated, augmented or otherwise changed the effects of social distance, mediated through a traditional social hierarchy, on the functioning of markets and in turn household incomes.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section II describes the data set, elaborates on the theoretical background and presents the empirical model for testing our hypotheses.
Section III presents descriptive statistics on income and poverty levels and change and on education and land endowments by social group and village regime. Section IV presents the main empirical results, followed by robustness tests, and a computation of counterfactual income, growth and poverty to illustrate the order of magnitude of the oppression and enclave effects we are able to identify. Section V concludes.
II. DATA, THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EMPIRCAL

FRAMEWORK
A. The data set
The data reported on here are derived from two large-scale household surveys that cover most of the territory of India, known as the Human Development Profile of Fuller (1996) and other contributors to the same volume contend that while caste-like arrangements are common, few willingly admit to their existence. Jeffrey et al (2007; 43) 
B. Upper caste and own dominance -theory and definitions
The caste dominance concept originates in the sociological and anthropological literature. In Srinivas's (1955; 18) Anderson (2005) finds no effects of population dominance on economic outcomes. As we explain below, our adopted empirical focus on land dominance partly reflects a constraint imposed by de facto village structures in rural India but also exploratory regressions supportive of Anderson's (2005) approach and Dumont's (1970) assertion that dominance is rooted in economic power captured by landownership alone.
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Conceptually, let the land of village j, L j , be distributed over m groups where n i represents the share of the village land that belongs to social group i. Hence, This forms the conceptual backbone for our main analysis. Two types of criticisms may be levelled against this sociologically anchored dominance measure.
Firstly, it neglects fragmentation or concentration among other social groups within a village; the more diverse and fragmented the remaining social groups, the more powerful the dominant group is expected to be. In addition, our dominance measure neglects the intensity of the power the dominant group is in a position to wield over other social groups. To neutralise such reservations, we use two alternative dominance measures as robustness checks. The first is the share of village land owned by the dominant group, the second a modified Herfindahl index. To see why, consider the Herfindahl index of concentration for village j which can be defined as:
To gauge why H j fails, let m=2 and n 1 =n 2 =0.5. While the market equivalent would be a situation of considerable concentration (limited fragmentation or fractionalization), the scope for group 1 to dominate group 2 should be exactly zero. To adjust for this weakness, we introduce the following modification:
where the subscript d refers to the land share owned by the dominant group. For a given share of the village land owned by the dominant group, the more fragmented is the land ownership of other groups, the higher is D j . In the example above, its value will be exactly zero, as it should be.
To construct our village level dominance measures we combine village level information on social structure and land ownership with evidence of the localespecific hierarchical status of precisely identified jatis. The village questionnaire administered in round 2 identifies the jati of the numerically dominant social group in each village, the percentage of village land this social group owns along with similar information for the next 4-8 most numerous social groups. Anthropological and other evidence on the status of different jatis is then used to develop a more refined upper caste definition as explained in Appendix 1. Given generally inactive rural land markets (Anderson 2005) , and that land-dominant groups tend to hold a much larger share of village land than any other group, 24 we assume that the village regime is identical in rounds 1 and 2.
24 Details are available from the authors.
C. Empirical model
Both the oppression and the enclave hypothesis refer to the extent to which the income level of households from different social groups is affected by the social identity of the dominant land owners of the village in which they reside. To statistically test these hypotheses, we model the relative differences in income by social group and village regime, controlling for location and household characteristics, as follows:
Subscript h denotes households, and t time. The real per capita income of a The last three terms in the right hand side of equation (4) form the error structure of the model. The first two error terms are, respectively, a random household specific effect, θ h , that is assumed to be independently distributed across households, and a random village specific effect, η v(h)t , which is assumed to be independently distributed across villages. The third error term, ε ht , is an idiosyncratic error term and 25 Throughout income is per capita per annum and in constant 1993/94 prices, converted using NSSO state-specific rural CPIs.
is assumed to be independently distributed across households, villages and time. The assumption of a random household specific effect, as opposed to a fixed effect, is required since incorporating a household specific fixed effect would make it impossible to identify oppression and enclave effects since, as noted, the village regime is constant over time and a panel household lives in the same village in both rounds.
We estimate equation (4) All parameters of equation (4) are allowed to vary with time which makes it possible to investigate changes in oppression and enclave effects between the two rounds and, subsequently, the implications for income growth and for poverty incidence and persistence. As discussed in section B, we explore the robustness of the main results to two alternative measures of dominance and for this purpose we replace the dummy dominance variables (e.g. DUC) with the upper caste land share (the first alternative) or the value of the dominance adjusted Herfindahl-index (the second alternative, eq. (3)).
III DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This section presents descriptive statistics on village regimes that are pertinent to the oppression and enclave hypotheses. 28 Anchored in Dumont's (1970) conception of caste dominance, as set out above, our empirical focus is on villages in which a particular social group owns the largest proportion of village land.
We first, however, present data on land and population dominance in the 679 villages in our panel. The technical challenge posed by separate identification of land and population dominance may be gauged from the diagonal which shows that population and land dominance are strongly correlated: for each social group, if it is population dominant, in over 90 percent of cases, it is also land dominant, and vice versa. There are two exceptions to this pattern -in 44 villages SCs are population, but not land-dominant.
There are also 39 villages where OBCs are population, but not land-dominant. We include separate terms to capture these two exceptions in our empirical analysis below. Table I shows that Upper caste dominance is the most common village regime, closely followed by villages dominated by OBCs. In comparison, the number of SC and Muslim dominated villages is relatively small. Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) find that parliamentary constituencies with a concentration of Brahmins had higher level of schools and piped water in 1971. 31 One wellknown form of emulation, 'Sanskritisation', refers to a low caste changing its 'customs, ritual, ideology and way of life in the direction of a high, and frequently "twice-born' caste'. (Srinivas 1966; 6) markets, a hostile school environment, exclusion from membership in the local dairy cooperative or restrictions in the access to local credit or microcredit schemes that facilitate taking advantage of new opportunities in the post reform era.
By incrementally controlling for important factor endowments in our empirical model we obtain clues about the pathways through which each of these effects operate. A trivial possibility would be that SCs living in own enclaves do better because of larger or higher quality land endowments which directly or via more education could translate into higher incomes. If so, enclave coefficients should turn insignificant once education and household land holdings are controlled for.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate how social identity interacted with village regime relate to two important factor endowments in rural India, namely basic education measured by male and female illiteracy and household land holdings. An a priori expectation of higher average round 1 land holdings in own dominated villages holds for UCs, STs and Muslims (marginally). The average SC household in UC dominated villages possessed more land than own enclave SC households only in round 1. OBCs in UC dominated villages owned less land than in own enclaves but more land than SCs in UC dominated villages. Consistent with expectations, the overall distribution of land holdings show UCs as the largest landowners followed by OBCs, STs, Muslims (except in UC dominated villages) and SCs. Patterns are much the same, although with more pronounced differences, for irrigated land.
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While rich, our observations so far are inconclusive about the effects of village regimes on income, income growth and poverty incidence and persistence; our next step is to implement the empirical strategy laid out in section II.
IV EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Section A presents the estimation results, section B performs a robustness check on the main results and section C explores the implications of our results for the level of income and income growth, and for the incidence and persistence of poverty by social group and village regime.
A. Estimation results
Eq. (4) is estimated for round 1 and 2 using alternative specifications where extra variables are gradually introduced. The estimation results for these specifications are reported in Tables III and IV Sets of related control variables are then gradually introduced: we think of agroecological zone indicators, state dummy variables and household composition 32 The consistent decline in land holdings, given that we are dealing with a panel, may look puzzling. Further disaggregation confirms this trend across states, suggesting that this is a real phenomenon. The most likely explanation is that in a sufficient number of first round households to affect mean values, elderly patriarchs resided in joint households with the oldest son (and this son's wife and offspring). In the intermediate period, some of these patriarchs died -while the oldest son's household remained intact, its land holdings was split among the oldest son and his siblings. variables 33 as 'pure' controls which are added in the specifications reported on in Table III ; village infrastructure, household education and land variables we think of as possible pathways through which enclave and oppression effects operate; these are added in the specifications reported on in Table IV . The full details are available in Appendix 2.
33 While household demography may affect well-being, demographic behaviour is unlikely to be affected by oppression and should be controlled for to identify true enclave and oppression effects. The coefficient corresponding to DUC, which is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, leaps notably in size between the two rounds. We also observe negative and statistically significant round 1 interaction terms ('oppression coefficients') for SCs, STs and Muslims. Further, the oppression effect disappears for STs and Muslims and becomes significant for OBCs in round 2.
For SCs we find a large and strongly significant positive enclave effect in round 2.
The round 2 enclave effect for Muslims is weaker. In addition, significant enclave coefficients for OBCs appear in both rounds.
The responses of the 'raw' identity and village regime coefficients to the step-wise introduction of each of the three sets of 'pure' controls may be gauged in full in SCs do much better in their own enclaves in both rounds but especially in round 2.
However, the weaker round 2 enclave effect for Muslims turns insignificant.
The precise implications of the positive externality and of the oppression and enclave effects for income levels, growth and poverty incidence and persistence are brought out in the computations and discussions of counterfactual income, growth and poverty in subsection C below.
These, our main results, may be qualitatively summarised as follows. UCs earn higher incomes than others in both rounds. In addition, UCs in own dominated villages perform better than other UCs. There is, moreover, a general and strong positive externality associated with residence in upper caste dominated villages. The coefficient on DUC is significant at the 1 percent level and of similar size in round 1 and 2. For the oppression coefficients, we observe that while Muslims and SCs did worse in UC dominated villages in round 1, SC disadvantage within such villages intensified while Muslims within such villages progressed in the post reform years.
OBCs in UC dominated villages were also at a disadvantage in round 2, but less so than SCs. Further, OBCs and, in particular, SCs do far better in own dominated villages in both rounds, but with the enclave effect in SC-dominated villages leaping dramatically in the post reform era. Overall, our results suggest more pronounced disadvantage for SCs and OBCs in upper caste dominated villages post reform and stronger enclave effects for SCs in round 2. One possible explanation is that it is in enclaves, where discrimination by powerful groups is less likely, that marginalised groups faced fewer obstacles in the access to markets and that such access gained in importance in the post reform years.
We next focus on the pathways through which oppression and enclave effects operate and of possible change in the post reform era. We gradually control for village infrastructure, for household education and household land holdings with results reported in full in table IV. Table IV Additional notes: Education variables are dummy variables used as controls for the highest level of male and female education in the household. Land refers to controls for the logarithm of owned household land measured in acres, and the logarithm of irrigated household land measured in acres. Village size is captured by village population (logarithm). The village infrastructure controls are the presence within the village of a busstop (1), or within its vicinity of a railway station (2), medical clinic (3), schools, and if so, at which level of education (4), or a market/mandi (5), as well as the type of road (footpath only, kutcha road, pucca road) that leads to the village (6). The full specification is reported in The round 1 results for these alternative specifications are in the top half of Table   V and the round 2 results in the bottom half. 17 out of the 22 coefficients (11 per round) on the village regime variables when using the land dominance dummy are robust in terms of retaining sign and statistical significance (or insignificance, as the case may be) regardless of which alternative dominance measure is used. 35 It is also noteworthy that significance of coefficients is generally stronger for the more refined dominance measures, especially for those capturing oppression.
Exploiting the panel dimension of our dataset, we also investigated whether changes in coefficients on village regime variables between rounds were statistically significant, for each of the specifications reported in Tables III and IV ------Notes: +++, ++, + indicates positive coefficient significant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, ---, --, -indicates negative coefficient significant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, Ns indicates not significant, all in the specification with social group, village regime, agro-ecological zones, state dummies and household demographic composition variables.
C. Magnitude of enclave and oppression effects
We next explore the order of magnitude of the enclave and oppression effects in terms of income, income growth, and the incidence and persistence of poverty. We do so by computing counterfactual income as if the significant coefficients on the social identity times village regime variables were equal to zero and use the coefficients from our model that includes AEZ, state dummies and household demographic controls. The enclave and oppression effects quantified here may be interpreted as aggregate effects, summed across all markets (and public services). We restrict the analysis to statistically significant enclave and oppression effects. For round 1 and 2 income per capita and poverty, and annual income growth between the two rounds, Rupees. The last figure is lower than their actual mean income, which shows that, in this case, the positive village regime effect is larger (in absolute terms) than the negative oppression effect.
The general village regime effect on income of marginalised groups living in UCdominated villages is always about 10 percent, both in round 1 and in round 2: mean income would thus have been some 10 percent lower were it not for this effect. Since the effect on income is approximately the same size in both rounds, the effect on growth is negligible. The effect on the headcount percentage of poverty, on the other hand, depends on the group specific distribution of income in the vicinity of the poverty line. Muslims in round 1 benefited most and OBCs in round 2 least: poverty would have been 8.9 percentage points higher for the former and 4.7 percentage points higher for the latter, were it not for the general village regime effect.
The group specific oppression effect on income of living in UC-dominated villages, when statistically significant, tends to be larger than the general village regime effect, with one exception (SCs in round 1). Income in such villages would have been 14.4 percent higher for SCs in round 2, 12.3 percent higher for OBCs in round 2, and 15.8 percent higher for Muslims in round 1. The effect on growth is pronounced, too. SCs would have experienced 1.8 instead of 1.3 percent annual growth (22 percent over the entire period instead of 15 percent) and OBCs 2.0 instead of 0.9 percent (24 instead of 10 percent), were it not for oppression. Although the oppression effect dominates the general village regime effect for income, this is not always the case for poverty, which must be related to peculiarities of the PDF of income. It is worth noting, though, that poverty reduction would have been about 8 instead of 3 percentage points for OBCs, were it not for oppression -SCs would have experienced about the same amount of poverty reduction as they experienced actually, because the level effect in both rounds was of the same order of magnitude.
Enclave effects in the specification used are significant only for SCs and OBCs, in both rounds. For OBCs they are of the same order of magnitude (but positive) as the oppression effects remarked on above for this group. For SCs they are much larger.
Income per capita would have been 13.1 percent lower in round 1, and 26.1 percent lower in round 2, annual growth 1.6 percentage points lower (20 percent less growth over the period), and poverty 7.6 and 18 percentage points lower in round 1 and round 2, were it not for the enclave effect. Poverty would have been far more persistent for SCs in own-dominated villages in the absence of this effect.
In summary, we find sizeable general village regime effects that benefit those residing in UC-dominated villages for income and poverty (but not for growth and The quantitative effects on income levels, growth, poverty incidence and poverty persistence were discerned. The income levels of SCs living in upper caste dominated villages would have been 8.5 percent higher in round 1 and 14.4 percent higher in round 2 in the absence of oppression effects, while annual income growth would have been 0.5 percentage points higher, 1.8 instead of 1.3 percent. Further, the poverty incidence would have been more than 5 percentage points lower.
The negative 'enclave' hypothesis advances the view that the slow progress of marginalised communities, rather than being attributable to external oppression, may be caused by factors internal to the community itself. In tune with Anderson's (2005) findings for Yadavs in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, but in our case extending to marginalised groups below the pollution barrier, Scheduled Caste households in own dominated villages experienced much more rapid poverty reduction between the two rounds. In round 2, their income is 26.1 percent higher than it would have been without the enclave effect, and their incidence of poverty 18 percentage points lower, 29.7 instead of 47.7 percent.
While our enclave results contrast with Munshi and Rosenzweig's (2006) findings from Mumbai, the magnitude of the raw social identity coefficients highlight the persistence of identity based disparities in rural India; whereas upper caste 'oppression' has contributed substantially to prolong poverty and to low income among SC and OBC households there are, at the same time, significant positive externalities associated with living in upper caste dominated villages.
We also shed new light on the routes through which the welfare disparities between different social groups within and outside villages dominated by upper castes may be closed. Educational attainment, while generally important and emphasised by other studies, matters outside UC dominated villages. Overall, however, the old recipe of land redistribution holds the key to neutralising disparities attributable to upper caste dominance. This is in notable contrast to Dercon and Krishnan's (2007) finding using the ICRISAT-data set which concluded that caste based disadvantages essentially have educational origins.
Our findings go further and show that once all factor endowment differences are controlled for, the round 1 gap between SCs, STs and OBCs dramatically narrows.
However, even after location, demography, village infrastructure and factor endowments are carefully controlled for, the raw coefficients suggest that SCs with a similar resource base and attributes as others not only remained the worst off but fell further behind STs and OBCs in the post reform years. The latter provides a useful empirical corrective to accounts suggestive of sustained SC progress relative to other groups. 36 The notable exception is SCs residing in own enclaves; the SC enclave coefficient remains large and strongly significant after land holdings and all other controls are added. Notice that Muslims also experienced a post-reform setback. Fuller (1996) and other contributors to the same volume contend that while caste-like arrangements are common, few within the Muslim community admit to their existence. In spite of social ranks among Muslims, the much less accurate reporting of the social groups that Muslim panel households belong to, left no other option but to define Muslim households by their religion alone. A similar strategy was adopted for Scheduled Tribes. Although the tribe a household belongs is accurately reported, ethnographic evidence is not supportive of local hierarchies; STs are thus a single social category in our analysis.
Secondly, the process of "de-Sanskritisation", whereby social groups lobby to downgrade their official status in order to avail of reservation benefits has the implication that the definitions of forward castes that anthropologists and sociologists, informed by careful field observations, subscribe to, are increasingly at odds with official and survey data social group categories. (Singh 1992; 41) . For the former two, the OBC classification is therefore appropriate.
In our interpretation of upper caste which is informed by anthropological observations, it is possible for a social group to fit the upper caste definition in some states, but not in others. The adopted approach may therefore be described as adhering to ritual rank as far as the top and bottom layer is concerned, but to disconnect, whenever appropriate and for reasons already mentioned, from official categories for the more fluid middle layer. While this imposes an extra work burden, it is vital to sharply distinguish our present and small-scale endeavour from past efforts to develop extensive caste rankings for rural India. British colonial administrators have subsequently been caricatured for believing in the possibility of such a task which at the time paved the way for an obsession with caste and jati among late Victorian data collectors (Bayly 1999, chapter 3) . For North-India, our classification of the most important and by far the most numerous groups (as well as households in our panel) is entirely consistent with the Mandal Commission's views: according to which the following broad groups should be treated as forward or upper castes; Brahmins, Rajputs, Kayasthas, Jats, Marathas and Banias (Singh 1992; 41 
